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Abstract: Th e main goal of the article is to discuss whether neoclassical realism (NCR), 
described as the most recent realist research programme might be perceived as a fruitful 
way of integrating IR theory with the assumptions of foreign policy analysis (FPA). Con-
sequently, the research question that has to be answered, is whether the NCR has suc-
ceeded as a new research programme developed as an attempt to give the Waltzian 
theory more explanatory power. Th e article starts with a critical analysis of the main as-
sumptions of the NCR, aft er which it focuses on FPA defi ned as a subdiscipline of IR. Th e 
third part of the text draws the attention to the neoclassical realism’s integration of ‘in-
tervening variables’ that bring FPA insights into the realist theoretical paradigm. It is ar-
gued that apart from numerous theoretical fl aws, there is still a possible way to develop 
its theoretical depth through careful borrowing from FPA.
Keywords: neoclassical realism, neorealism, foreign policy analysis, systemic pressures, 
unit-level variables, analytic eclecticism
After all, there is no ‘truth’ out there waiting for discovery by one all-embracing theory.
We are, therefore, in the business of dealing with competing theories and explanations,
and in this light FPA has aided, and can continue to aid, the study of international relations.
Steve Smith (1986, p. 25)
The article draws the readers’ attention to the relation between neoclassical real-
ism (NCR) and selected theoretical assumptions associated with foreign policy 
analysis (FPA), which, according to some scholars’ opinion, over the last 25 years 
has been largely ignored by almost all the IR theories. Therefore, Juliet Kaarbo 
(2015, pp. 189–215) emphasized that the current IR is marked by a paradox re-
1 For many helpful comments and suggestions, I would like to thank Stefano Guzzini from the 
Danish Institute for International Studies and the Uppsala University.
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lated to the role of domestic level factors.2 In spite of incorporating some deci-
sion-making concepts, (like state motives, perceptions, domestic political insti-
tutions, public opinion, and political culture etc.), much of IR theory ignores the 
development of FPA research. The opinion of this author suggesting that, ‘do-
mestic politics and decision-making processes are simultaneously everywhere 
and nowhere’ (Kaarbo, 2015, p. 189), has drawn my attention not only to possi-
bilities offered by the NCR, but also to some challenges resulting from this re-
search programme and its potential connections with FPA.
The main goal of the presented article is to discuss whether the NCR, de-
scribed frequently as the most recent realist research programme (the newest re-
alism), is a fruitful and seminal way of integrating IR theory with FPA assump-
tions. In spite of being created as a kind of theoretical promise and a way forward 
after the critique of the neorealism, the NCR (or its adherents) has to show that 
the criticism resulting from the ‘dizzy mixture’ of factors operating at both sys-
temic and domestic levels can be overcome. Consequently, the research ques-
tion I want to answer here is whether the neoclassical realism has succeeded as 
a new research programme developed as a result of an attempt to give the Waltz-
ian theory more explanatory power. As the version of realist theory proposed by 
him turned out to be too sparse and underspecified, some scholars have consid-
ered it as being in need of elaboration. Consequently, they started to add varia-
bles operating at domestic level and transforming systemic pressures and in this 
way tried to develop some kind of a new subparadigm (Narizny, 2017, pp. 159–
161). The result of this elaboration was the realist (neoclassical realist) version 
of a theory of foreign policy that I want to discuss below. Additionally, I want to 
explore whether the NCR, according to the opinion of Valerie Hudson (2016,
pp. 32–33), is truly a seminal way of bridging IR and FPA.
The structure of the article is as follows. Firstly, I will lay out the core as-
sumptions of neoclassical realism which will be presented together with the crit-
2 In the late of 1990s some IR theorists were working on advancing theories or research pro-
grammes focusing not only on the structure of international system, but also incorporating do-
mestic politics. Firstly, Andrew Moravcsik (1997, pp. 513–553) developed a liberal theory that 
makes societal preferences the foundation of state behaviour. Secondly, Gideon Rose (1998,
p. 146) pointed out that a few of books published during the last decade of the 20th century 
successfully integrated systemic pressures and factors operating at the state level. Consequent-
ly, he called this new research programme ‘neoclassical realism’. Although both of the above 
mentioned theories focus on the problem of combining different levels of analysis, the essen-
tial distinction between them is still significant. The liberal theory presented by Moravcsik is 
a bottom-up, domestic society-based theory that incorporates systemic variables, whereas the 
neoclassical realism is described as a top-down, international system-based theory that inte-
grates factors operating at the state level (Narizny, 2017, pp. 155–156). Yet, both of them are 
considered as a way of involving domestic pressures and crossing different levels of analysis.
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icism of this research programme. I will stress that developing a foreign policy 
theory on the basis of neorealism could be considered as a confusing and com-
plex project not only because of all the difficulties of linking structural pressures 
of the international systems with domestic variables, but also because of all the 
difficulties of merging two different logics of theory building and tension be-
tween different philosophies of science represented by FPA and structural re-
alism (Weaver, 2009, pp. 201–221). I will point out that although FPA assump-
tions might offer a complementarity to a NCR-based analysis of state’s action, 
one has to carefully assess or evaluate this programme as it might lead to some 
methodological errors, mainly due to its lack of internal coherence. By going be-
yond a recognition of domestic structure and incorporating many different in-
tervening variables, i.a. the role of perception or political leadership, neo-classi-
cal realism seems to offer much more than only an undifferentiated depiction of 
the state that still remains one of its main characteristics. Nonetheless, one has 
to also mention that the way of creating the research programme of neoclassi-
cal realism takes the systemic assumptions for granted and asks only the ques-
tion – how do states respond to them (Wæver, 2009, pp. 213–214) which could 
cause some problems regarding the issue of theory building which will be also 
discussed. What is more, adherents of the NCR have incorporated myriad of in-
tervening variables which, according to the main assumptions of the proposed 
programme, are transforming the systemic pressures. However, without close at-
tention to the paradigm boundaries, the incorporation of infinite number of in-
tervening domestic factors might lead to serious methodological errors and as 
a consequence to coming back  to the situation before the Waltz’s conception. 
In the second part of the article, I will draw the attention to the position of FPA 
that is not fully acknowledged as part of IR theories as well as to its possibilities 
to engage with an ongoing dialogue with the discipline. Once these issues have 
been elucidated, the third and main part of the article will draw the attention to 
the neoclassical realism’s integration of ‘intervening variables’ that bring FPA in-
sights into the realist theoretical paradigm. In this part of the text I will focus on 
the balance of threat theory of Michael Walt and the assumptions regarding the 
role of perception formulated by William Wohlforth. This part also implies that 
neo-classical realism might develop its greater theoretical depth through careful 
borrowing from FPA. Finally, I will conclude that the possibility of bridging the 
NCR with assumptions commonly ascribed to FPA might lead to a very interest-
ing kind of eclectic scholarship which consequently could help both the main-
stream IR theories to integrate domestic level variables and theories of foreign 
policy to gain a structural dimension.
Additionally, what I am going to discuss and show in this article is that, apart 
from numerous ambiguities that the NCR has caused, the possibility of linking de-
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cision-making factors and conception of agency that are mostly ascribed to FPA 
with the assumptions of some of the ‘mainstream’ IR theories focused largely on 
the third (structural) level of analysis might be perceived as a type of remedy for 
current challenges and future problems of the IR discipline. Consequently, this 
kind of ‘theoretical dialogue’ should contribute to some kind of ontological reori-
entation within the discipline, which is currently facing calls for ‘the end of IR the-
ory’ (Dunne, Hansen, Wight, 2013, pp. 405–425). Theoretical and methodological 
pluralisms, considered as a result of the ‘great debates’ lasting since the inception 
of the discipline and described by many scholars as causing disputes and stopping 
theoretical development, have caused the need for a deeper reflection on the pos-
sible progress of the international relations scholarship. Therefore, a seminal and 
well considered research programme that offers a possibility of linking system-
ic pressures with domestic factors might be considered as a beneficial enterprise.
I am also aware of the fact that focusing on the only one of IR theories is 
a very modest contribution to the academic debate, however I have to bear in 
mind all the restrictions typical for journal publications as well as the very spe-
cific topic of this issue. Nevertheless, by showing this way of engaging FPA 
with IR theory, I hope to stress that despite the problems generated by ‘para-
digmatic wars’, we cannot abandon meta-theoretical debates. The latter, how-
ever, might lead to some kind of analytical engagement of IR theorists. As John
J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt (2013, pp. 427–457) pointed out in their al-
ready very famous article, in order to achieve progress within the discipline and 
produce cumulative knowledge, we have to focus on refining existing theories 
and developing new ones as well as to engage in theoretical debates and privilege 
theory as we did before. As IR scholars we cannot focus on ‘simplistic hypothe-
sis testing’, but should make an effort to create and refine theories or use theory 
to guide empirical research. According to the authors, focusing only on hypoth-
esis testing, although reflecting a long-standing desire to professionalize the dis-
cipline might lead to misspecified empirical models, misleading measures of key 
concepts and consequently unsatisfying empirical findings (2013, pp. 438–49). 
Additionally, they called for a more diverse and plural intellectual community of 
different research traditions (2013, p. 430).
This assumption corresponds with guidelines formulated by Rudra Sil and Pe-
ter Katzenstein (2010, pp. 411–343) and referring to eclectic scholarship defined, 
however not directly, as a form of theoretical pluralism. The authors stressed that 
it is not only based on strong theoretical foundations, but also consistent with the 
ethos of pragmatism. Although they did not focus on FPA, I claim that to some 
extent their assumptions are present in FPA. Consequently the FPA-IR relation 
might be perceived as a kind of eclectic scholarship as well. All the three guide-
lines that are required by this kind of study are also fulfilled by FPA.
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Firstly, open-ended problem formulation (one of the three criteria) is a very 
important characteristic of almost all FPA research that does not look for univar-
iate explanations with one single dominant theory. FPA scholars are less engaged 
in theoretical debates and their primary purpose is not to defend the core pos-
tulates of a theory, but rather to focus on more useful empirical work. FPA has 
never been organized or divided into different and incommensurable schools of 
thoughts, but rather looking for solutions of empirical problems.
Secondly, in order to satisfy the second marker, the eclectic scholarship has 
to be middle-range in scope and make use of ‘multiple mechanisms and logics 
drawn from more than one paradigm’ (Sil, Katzenstein, 2010, p. 415). Since the 
mid-1960s James Rosenau (1966, pp. 27–92) has encouraged FPA scholars to 
focus on actor-specific theories that mediate between grand principles and the 
complexity of reality. That was a step towards Robert Merton’s concept of middle 
range theory. Obviously, that is not enough to qualify this attempt as an eclectic 
scholarship, however some recent works offer not only middle-range theory de-
velopment, but also applying of multiple theories. A very good example of mak-
ing use of multiple theoretical mechanisms is the article of William Flanik (2011, 
pp. 361–447) who uses the concept of ‘metaphorical framing’ borrowed from 
cognitive linguistics in order to combine assumptions of cognitive foreign poli-
cy analysis with social constructivism. In this way he blends not only FPA with 
IR theory, but also two different research programmes. Consequently, his adop-
tion of ‘metaphorical framing’ is mutually beneficial for FPA and IR, as it trans-
lates different concepts and brings two different levels of analysis. What is more, 
his aim is (as he mentioned in the title) ‘to bring FPA back home’ (Flanik, 2011, 
p. 361) that clearly shows that FPA has always been close to the IR.
Finally, according to the practical engagement (third marker of analytical 
eclecticism), one has to stress that FPA has always been less engaged in philo-
sophical deliberating, but rather focused on practical research that could be
afterwards explained to the public opinion. Additionally, FPA scholars have 
frequently been engaged in practical issues and focused on doing research 
not only for political institutions, but also intelligence agencies – for instance, 
Robert Jervis has been consulting for the CIA with regard to issues of threat
perception.
Linking IR theories with FPA research might be considered as a kind of 
movement toward analytical eclecticism as it does not require theoretical syn-
thesis and at the same time a voluntary theoretical convergence of some scholars 
upon new foundational principles, but offers a possible foundation for theoreti-
cally integrative and methodologically pluralist research. Yet, one has to mention 
here that the proposed task seems to be easy, but in fact is not so straightforward, 
what I am also going to show in the following parts of the article.
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Neo-classical realism – a way forward or backwards?
The neo-classical realism (NCR), frequently described as one of the most sur-
prising theoretical developments emerging from the current IR, has been mainly 
derived from a critique of neorealism3 formulated by representatives of this par-
adigm.4 Various realists have resigned from explaining states’ behaviour by refer-
ring to system-level variables only and started to construct a new variant of the 
theory that will be able to explain why under the same systemic pressures states 
act differently or simply not do what the theory predicts (Waltz, 1979; Wivel, 
2005). A growing number of scholars (incl. Snyder, 1991; Wohlforth, 1993; Za-
karia, 1998; Schweller, 2004) have stressed the importance of combining system-
ic and unit-level variables. Thus, they did not reject the systemic explanations, 
but tried to show their incompleteness. As a consequence, all the above men-
tioned realists underlined that the systemic pressures had to be supplemented by 
some domestic variables including e.g. the risk perception, political leadership, 
domestic institutions etc. In 1998 Gideon Rose termed this branch of realism 
‘neo-classical realism’. In the article Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign 
Policy he stressed its connections with assumptions typical for classical realism 
of i.a. Hans Morgenthau. Neo-classical realists reached back to classical realism’s 
toolkit for arguments or theories providing better foreign policy analysis. How-
ever, by using the prefix neo-, Rose (1998, pp. 144–172) showed that this version 
of realist paradigm is different from neorealism of Kenneth Waltz. According to 
Rose, adherents of NCR argue that ‘the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign 
policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and 
specifically by its relative material power capabilities’ (1998, p. 146). That is the 
reason of calling them realists. However, all the systemic pressures are translat-
ed through intervening variables situated at the unit level – and that is why they 
are neoclassical. As Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (2006, pp. 464–495) stressed, in order 
to study states’ foreign policy in the way formulated by neo-classical realists, one 
should pay attention not only to analytical strengths of neo-realists such as Waltz 
3 Neorealism, frequently termed also as structural realism was developed by Kenneth Waltz, 
who translated core classical realist ideas into a deductive, top-down theoretical framework 
and at the same time provided realism with self-conscious scientism. He stressed that the fea-
tures of the overall system of states affect their interactions. The ordering principle of inter-
national system is anarchy that leads to powerful competitive pressure and war, regardless of 
internal politics of states (Waltz, 1979).
4 The second branch of the critique has been formulated by neoliberal institutionalists and rep-
resentatives of social constructivism who stressed that apart from systemic pressures there are 
also many other factors influencing states’ behaviour, like i.a.: society’s preferences or a set of 
ideational factors (norms, ideas, beliefs or identities) operating both within the state and the 
international system.
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or Robert Gilpin, but also to analytical power of unit level studies of classical re-
alists such as Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger or Arnold Wolfers.5
However, one has to mention here that the term ‘neoclassical realism’ for-
mulated by Rose regarded several works published in the 1990s that collective-
ly constitute to some extent a coherent school of thought. The main feature of 
this school was an integration of factors operating at different levels of analysis, 
however, it has to be pointed out very clearly that each scholar representing the 
NCR was focused on a different set of domestic factors transforming the pres-
sures of international system. This situation makes the picture of the NCR quite 
complicated. One might even suggest that adherents of this research programme 
(or subparadigm) would see a green light ‘for the incorporation of any sort of do-
mestic factor […] without constraint’ (Narizny, 2017, p. 170). What makes the 
picture even more complex is the fact that Rose distinguished only two kinds of 
unit-level intervening variables (perceptions of relative power dynamics and the 
ability of the state to mobilize resources) and suggested that the proposed pro-
gramme is neoclassical realism (Rose, 1998, pp. 167–168) which is literally not 
true. The programme that he described is rather a kind of different set of theo-
ries under a broad umbrella with only one distinction, namely a mixture of sys-
temic pressures with domestic politics with a strong believe that the first matter 
more. In his somehow famous article Rose did not formulate a set of neoclassical 
realist assumptions that would identify the research programme. He just point-
ed out that it is a kind of attempt of integrating systemic and unit-level factors, 
but without even defining a way of how to engage domestic politics with system-
ic pressures and how to distinguish it from liberal proposal of mixing these two 
levels of analysis (Narizny, 2017, pp. 170–171).
The first attempt to identify neoclassical realism as a deductive theoret-
ical structure that resembled the proposition of Waltz, Moravcsik or Alexan-
der Wendt, was realized by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey 
W. Taliaferro in their work from 2009 Neoclassical Realism, the State, and For-
eign Policy. They defined neoclassical realism in paradigmatic terms, but called 
it a research programme – not a theory. The core assumptions of it are based on 
two guidelines. Firstly, the authors resigned from identifying states’ motives and 
stressed that every work applying the NCR should define its baseline from sev-
eral realist options: offensive realism, defensive realism, balance of threat theo-
ry, hegemonic theory etc. Secondly, four categories of intervening variables were 
defined: cognition, strategic culture, state-society relations and domestic insti-
5 The difference in their understanding of human nature is however worth of noting here. All 
of them saw human nature as static, whereas both NCR’s assumptions and FPA research see it 
as changing, dynamic and influenced by many different factors.
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tutions (Lobell, Ripsman, Taliaferro, 2009, pp. 67–68). Finally, the authors iden-
tify and describe conditions under which certain variables matter more than 
others. The most significant in the assumptions proposed by them is the fact 
that they did not exclude any variable either did not formulate any constrains 
of the possibilities of applying them. However, the main problem of the pro-
posed assumption regards systemic pressures, because the authors did not de-
fine their influence on states’ behaviours. By stressing that each neoclassical re-
alist work could in fact define on which realist subparadigm it is based, there 
is no need to perceive the systemic pressure as an important factor. As a con-
sequence, if the system constraints are not important and much depends on 
the choice of theoretical baseline, than there is no necessity to suggest that neo-
realism is a part of the NCR. It is only its baseline. Finally, this might imply 
that the programme of neoclassical realism is in fact not a descendant of neo-
realism, but rather a kind of eclectic scholarship which additionally includes
factors typical for FPA.
The essence of the NCR is that unit-level (domestic) variables are influenc-
ing states’ effectiveness of responding to the international system incentives. 
The systemic pressures are not (as Waltz claimed) immediately transformed into 
states’ actions, but the translation process is a very complex and indirect one. 
Moreover, the domestic variables are the central piece of this translation chain. 
Consequently, the international system is perceived as not the only one, yet still 
very important, of foreign policy constraints being faced by countries. Accord-
ing to Waltz, its theory lists a set of international system constraints that are gen-
erated by different (bi-, uni- or multipolar) system types. Nevertheless, his critics 
stressed that the theory does not explain how the systemic opportunities (pres-
sures) are used by different states and which factors determine their employ-
ment. It does not answer the question whether opportunities offered by the in-
ternational system will be taken by states in an appropriate way (however Waltz 
did not want his theory to do this). Therefore, one cannot predict states’ behav-
iour according to their systemic positions. The power distribution within the 
international system might bound grand strategy, but, according to the NCR, 
its implementation cannot by inferred from the system level of analysis. The 
implementation of the strategy through decisions taken by foreign policy ex-
ecutives is based on threat assessment, risk, mobilization of domestic resources,
including public support etc. The unit-level variables might constrain or facil-
itate the states’ abilities to respond to the systemic imperatives (Lobell et al., 
2009, p. 4). The anarchy of the international system (viewed as one of the main 
characteristics of neorealism) is therefore only a permissive condition rath-
er than one single independent casual force (Walt, 2002, p. 211). As a conse-
quence, one may assume that the NCR seeks to rectify the imbalance between 
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the general and the particular or, in other words, tries to combine different levels
of analysis. Its most important task is to combine elements of different level of 
analysis and give them explanatory power. Moreover, apart from the attempt 
of systemic and unit level combination, the NCR tries to mix the material and 
ideational ontology. The exemplary domestic variables mentioned above clear-
ly demonstrate that the NCR refers not only to the material reality, but also to 
non-material factors like the role of perception. As it will be showed in next 
sections, these two very important features of the NCR have made the theory
come under siege.
It has to be also mentioned here, that although the NCR might be nowadays 
considered as being on the rise to a full and well-developed subschool of realism 
(Wohlforth, 2016, p. 39), by some scholars it is described as only a kind of analyt-
ical distinction and not a coherent theoretical school or an independent research 
programme (Legro, Moravcsik, 1999, pp. 5–55). The NCR’s adherents have been 
developing a very complex theoretical picture of the international system and its 
pressures being transformed by domestic variables. However, there are a myriad 
of the intervening variables that have been applied by different NCR’s advocates 
which make the theory being described as a kind of non-falsifiable ‘pick and 
choose’ strategy. For instance, William Wohlforth (1993) stressed that the deci-
sions are influenced by political leaders’ perceptions of relative power, whereas 
Stephen M. Walt (1987; 2002) was focused on the perception of intent. Randall 
Schweller (1998) referred to state motivations and Jervis (2005) to states’ cost-
benefit analysis in economic and security affairs. Additionally, some neo-classi-
cal realists underlined  the importance of the political tradition as well as identity 
of political elites (Friedberg, 2000; Monten, 2005) together with the implications 
of dominant interpretations of national history and perception of the nation’s 
past (Mouritzen, Wivel, 2005). Moreover, they stressed the balance of power be-
tween domestic institutions (Zakaria, 1998) as well as the role of propaganda 
of domestic coalitions (Snyder, 1991). Michael C. Desch (1999) focused on the 
very specific relationship between the threat environment and civil-military re-
lations and Sten Rynning together with Stefano Guzzini (2001) underlined the 
importance of the change within military doctrines. All of these variables not 
only show that the link between the system and the foreign policy choices is very 
complex, but also make evident their plurality and variety. All of them are able to 
explain dependent variables, however the majority of them can encompass just 
a set of specific foreign policy decisions and not patterns of outcomes within the 
international system (Lobell et al., 2009). This has led to at least two types of crit-
icism formulated against ‘the newest realism’.
Firstly, as Schweller (2003) pointed out, the specific foreign policy decisions 
can be uncovered only through detailed case studies and as a consequence the 
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NCR analyses are frequently accused of offering only a collection of ad hoc (and 
according to some scholars even post hoc) arguments based on a single case or 
very few selected case studies. This has led many IR scholars to face a very dif-
ficult choice between seeking parsimony or logical elegance and complexity (or 
contextual subtlety). Some theoretical opponents have also suggested that for-
mulating of post hoc arguments has resulted in developing a ‘degenerative re-
search paradigm’ that has lost its distinctiveness vis-à-vis traditional and new-
ly formulated theoretical alternatives – like liberalism or social constructivism. 
As Jeffrey Legro and Moravcsik (1999, pp. 5–55) suggested, post hoc efforts to 
explain neorealist anomalies have resulted in paradigmatic incoherence and in-
distinctiveness.6 Moreover, while developing his neoclassical realist’s assump-
tions, Schweller (2004) pointed out, that ‘whether states [choose to] balance 
against threats is not primarily determined by structural-systemic factors’ but 
rather, like all decisions , ‘by the domestic political process’ (Schweller, 2004, 
p. 9). After this statement, which is de facto not a strict neorealist claim, he fo-
cused on three main variables: elite cohesion, social cohesion and government 
stability. When all of them are high, political elites reach consensus on foreign 
policy and consequently respond appropriately to systemic pressures – which 
means that they decide to continue or change the state’s foreign policy. When 
one or more of the above mentioned variables declines, the state is being para-
lyzed and cannot react in an appropriate way – which means that the state un-
derbalances. By introducing this set of domestic variables Schweller has in fact 
redefined the realist concept of ‘capability’ that is crucial for this theory, but as 
far as he treats them as exogenously given, the structural realists might forgive 
him. Yet, another problem of his proposition lies in the distinction between 
revolutionary and non-revolutionary states, which according to him are func-
tionally differentiated. And that is a violation of one of core neorealist assump-
tions, because Schweller stressed that it is ideology what motivates revolution-
ary states – which is in fact another intervening variable. This locates variation 
in states’ behaviour within domestic preferences without discussing their ori-
gins what makes the Schweller’s argument ad hoc, as he did not even link the 
role of ideology with mobilization of states resources or with one of his three 
variables, what would certainly improve his idea (Narizny, 2017, p. 173). This 
kind of explanation of states’ behaviour is definitely a combination of two dif-
ferent theories: one is the systemic one and second is the domestic level one, 
6 One has to stress here that, according to Brian Rathburn (2008, pp. 294–321), realists have 
not fought back these arguments. They did not admit that in fact they are bound by a cer-
tain logic in their approach and stressing the ‘hard core’ of its paradigm. See: St. Walt (1997, 
pp. 931–935), Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder (1997, pp. 919–926), Schweller (1997,
pp. 927–930).
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but as a result we do not get an aggregate effect but rather two inadequately
integrated theories.
Secondly, this version of realism is under siege because of some, above sig-
nalled, theoretical inadequacies which are of paramount importance for those 
who attempt to develop a new kind of research programme or a new version of 
neorealism. As it has been mentioned before, the theory proposed by Waltz has 
been frequently described as being too elegant and at the same time too parsi-
monious – as the author famously stressed, ‘structures  tell us a small number of 
big and important things’ (Waltz, 1986, p. 329). This statement is however reg-
ularly misinterpreted and has consequently resulted in accusing Waltz’s concep-
tion of being underspecified. As Ole Wæver reasonably suggested, almost all 
theories are underspecified but that is why they are ‘sparse in formulation and 
beautifully simple’ (Wæver, 2009, p. 212). The specification comes when we are 
trying to test the theory or simply apply it. The idea of incorporating as many 
intervening variables as possible in order to get more specific picture of real-
ity without a clear instruction about how to do it might consequently lead to 
serious errors. Moreover, it is in contradiction with the Waltz’s idea of theory, 
who frequently stressed that theory is a mental picture or a creative idea that 
helps to explain general laws. Therefore, following this way of thinking, theo-
ries can only be invented and not discovered. Moreover, theories have to be ab-
stract and distanced from the real world in order to be able to explain it. Neo-
classical realists, by adding different variables to the idea of Waltz, are in fact 
against him and are becoming unable to keep their adherence to assumptions 
formulated by him. Instead, by adding more and more intervening variables, 
they are creating a kind of 1:1 model of reality and not a theory. I am in favour 
of Wæver’s argument that this way of theory building (no matter if we are in fa-
vour of this theory building strategy or not) is at odds with the Waltz’s proposi-
tion, therefore it is difficult for the NCRs to emphasize that they have adopted 
his ideas regarding the role of the structure. What is more, they are not explain-
ing how and to what extent they accept his ideas. Most of the works, described 
as applying neoclassical realism, take for granted the assumption that the inter-
national system structure constrains states’ behaviour and test only the second 
part of the theory proposed by them. That means that the authors are focused 
only on the second part of their proposal (the part involving the role of inter-
vening variables) and not on the combination of variables operating at different
levels of analysis.
Apart from all weaknesses of neoclassical realism, one of its strengths is an 
applicability to analyze foreign policy mainly due to adopting unit level variables 
what more parsimonious theories cannot do. Yet, that makes the NCR a theory of 
foreign policy and not a theory of international relations, but we have to bear in 
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mind that although Waltz stressed that these are two different kind of theories, he 
in fact did not refuse the foreign policy theories.7 This is, however, also the main 
challenge of the NCR – to combine systemic pressures with unit level variables is 
such a way as to provide them with explanatory power. Additionally, one has to 
combine them without ignoring the ideational character of many of domestic fac-
tors. All these challenges will be discussed in following parts of the text which also 
aims to answer the research question formulated in the first paragraph.
FPA – a theory without a chapter
In the title of his famous article from 1996 Waltz stressed that ‘International pol-
itics is not foreign policy’ and in this way confirmed the very clear separation 
between IR and FPA.8 Since its inception in the 1950s,9 FPA has been developed 
separately from the mainstream IR theories and excluded itself from the IR dis-
cipline.10 Its theoretical ground has been human decision makers who act sin-
gly or within groups and as a result the particularities of the human beings have 
been perceived as vitally important to understanding foreign policy.11 It has re-
sulted in the most distinguishing feature of FPA, namely its classification by unit 
7 Waltz just excluded domestic attributes from his theory and stressed that the [neorealist] the-
ory explains why states similarly placed behave similarly despite their internal differences. 
The explanation of states’ behaviour is found at the international, and not at the national, lev-
el. That is why the theory is called a theory of international politics. In contrast, a theory of 
foreign policy would explain why states similarly placed in a system behave in different ways. 
Differences in behaviour arise from differences of internal composition. Foreign policies are 
governmental products (Waltz, 1996, pp. 54–55).
8 Wendt also stressed that he is (like Waltz)’ interested in international politics, not foreign pol-
icy’ and in this way, with reference to David Houghton’s and William Flanik’s opinion pointed 
out that FPA is ‘a theory without a home’, ‘treated indifferently by nonpractitioners and lacks 
its own chapter in most IR books’. See: Houghton (2007, p. 26) and Flanik (2011, p. 423).
9 It has to be mentioned here that the term ‘foreign policy’ has been the subject of reflection for 
more than two thousand years – from Thucydides. Gunther Hellmann and Knud E. Jørgensen 
(2016, p. 7) stressed that foreign policy, defined in terms of the pursuit of external interests by 
sovereign states, emerged after the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648. It came to the increasing use 
in 18th century, when first ministers of foreign affairs became members of governments. Their 
activity became the subject of reflection or commentary that was not only technical (qualities 
of skilled diplomacy), but also political (results of foreign policy). The first publication that 
had in its title the phrase ‘foreign policy’ was published in 1936 in Great Britain (see: Haliżak, 
2018, pp. 13–61).
10 For more about this division see: Kaarbo (2015, pp. 189–216) and Pietraś (2018, pp. 165–213).
11 According to the opinion of Hudson (2005, p. 2), which has dominated FPA theorizing, ‘the 
explanandum of foreign policy analysis includes the process and resultants of human decision 
making with reference to or having known consequences for foreign entities’.
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of analysis, the actor-specific sources of foreign policy. Consequently, the pro-
cess of foreign policy decision making has become as important as its outcome 
and this still continues to be the distinctive feature of FPA. It is also worth not-
ing that during the time of its development, FPA was boxed under political sci-
ence branch of public policy and not under the IR.12 This separation has been 
additionally organizationally confirmed by different journals or conferences fo-
cused on either foreign policy or IR.13 This lack of true engagement between the 
IR theoreticians and the FPA researchers was confirmed in 2005 by the estab-
lishment of Foreign Policy Analysis – a journal that offers a distinctive or even al-
ternative debate on issues that are outside the IR debate. I argue that this separa-
tion might be overcome and FPA and IR might be perceived as complementary, 
especially after the period of a so called ‘domestic turn’ within IR. Moreover, fol-
lowing Walter Carlsnaes, I claim that FPA is a subdiscipline of IR.14 According 
to this author, almost all foreign policy analysts today do agree ‘that they belong 
squarely to the scholarly domain of IR rather than to any of the policy scienc-
es’ (2010, p. 331), however some of them are also aware of quite opposite opin-
ions even within the Polish academia (Kuźniar 2018, pp. 177–184).15 Moreover, 
IR scholars have been also associated with the foreign policy analysis, especial-
ly from the inception of the discipline that was dominated by realist paradigm 
and analysis of states’ behaviour. That is why Sten Rynning together with Ste-
fano Guzzini (2001, p. 2) asked, ‘what else, if not analyzing foreign policy, had 
a large bulk of scholars been doing?’ before the inception of FPA. One might as-
sume that they had in mind the IR scholars, who have been interested in states’ 
foreign policies, especially during that times when the international system was 
dominated by sovereign actors.
The history and evolution of FPA clearly show that from its beginnings in the 
1950s, the research community was focused on the grand theory building that 
dominated theoretical reflections during two decades. Three paradigmatic works 
12 The division between FPA and IR was showed quite clearly by the publication of the chapter 
‘Foreign Policy’ in the volume on ‘Policies and Policymaking’ and not in ‘International Poli-
tics’ in the volume ‘Handbook of Political Science’ issued in 1975 (see: Cohen, Harris, 1975, 
pp. 381–437).
13 Nonetheless, for some scholars this separation has always been unnecessary. In a field that is 
itself only a subdivision of political science, increasing specialization may lead to confusions, 
closed discourses within different subdisciplines and intellectual entropy.
14 It has to be also mentioned here that James Rosenau (1976, p. 370, as quoted in Korany, 1986, 
p. 42) as well as Charles Kegley and Richard A. Skinner (1976, p. 303, as quoted in Korany, 
1986, p. 42) in the 1970s suggested that the comparative study of foreign policy has emerged 
as ‘normal science in the Kuhnian sense’.
15 Some scholars suggest that foreign policy analysis is a domain of states and therefore belongs 
to the same extent to Political Science as to International Relations (Kuźniar, 2018, p. 178).
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laid the foundation of FPA, namely Richard Snyder and his colleagues’ (1954, 1962, 
2002) publication focused on decision making processes; Rosenau (1974) on com-
parative foreign policy (CFP) and Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956) on the psy-
cho-social milieu of foreign policy decision making (FPDM). They were the first 
generation of scholars working within FPA with tremendous enthusiasm. This pe-
riod was characterized by great strides in conceptualizations as well as big efforts 
in data collection (Hudson, 2016, p. 17). Consequently, many of the first-genera-
tion scholars adopted quantitative, positivist model of theory building. The second 
wave of theorizing started in the late 1970s. It was a period of critical self-reflec-
tion dominated by deliberations and tensions between the desire for hard-science-
like grand theory and the assumptions that micro-level detailed explanations are 
also necessary. The works published during that time (mainly between 1974 and 
1993) were focused mostly on: small-group decision making (Janis, 1982; Sem-
mel, Minix, 1979; Tetlock, 1979; Breslauer, Tetlock, 1991); organizational process 
and bureaucratic politics (Allison, Halperin, 1972; Halperin, Kanter, 1973); com-
parative foreign policy (McGowan, Shapiro, 1973); psychological influences on 
foreign policy decision making (Hermann, 1970; 1978; Hermann, Kegley, 1994; 
Jervis, 1976; Walt, 2002) as well as societal context (Putnam, 1988; Kaarbo, 1993; 
Skidmore, Hudson, 1993; Hagan, 1993).16 During the time of self-reflection, FPA 
scholars had to deal with two big dilemmas between: parsimony or micro-level 
details and qualitative or quantitative research. Additionally, CFP dwindled in the 
1980s, since it did not fulfil its promises and the expression ‘comparative foreign 
policy’ started to sound rather naïve. Finally, FPA scholars decided to stay focused 
on middle-range theories considering them as complementary to the mainstream 
IR theories, especially after the fall of the Iron Curtain. As Hudson (2016, p. 30) 
lucidly articulated, ‘as FPA was being liberated from its inconsistencies in the late 
1980s, the world was being liberated from the chess match of the Cold War’. Ac-
tually, the actor-general theory was more appropriate during the Cold War, when 
states were considered as black boxes and de facto little was known of the closed 
communist regimes. It corresponds with the idea of James L. Ray that the most ap-
propriate way of understanding ‘levels of analysis’ is to consider them as different 
social entities. Consequently, also IR scholars should not focus on the structural 
level only, but instead see how different levels of analysis (characterized as social 
entities) influence different aspects of analyzed reality.17
16 Hudson classified them as the second-generation of the FPA scholars, however Laura Neack, 
Jeanne A.K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney (1995, p. 3) have counted them as representatives of the 
first generation who remained outside the CFP paradigm.
17 This periodization is proposed by Hudson, however one has to stress there are also other pub-
lications offering different classifications of the FPA historiography. See: Smith (2012), Neack, 
Hey, Haney (1995).
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Polish publications quite often touch the topic of the foreign policy analy-
sis (Pałyga, Symonides, 1978; Kostecki, 1988; Pietraś,1998; Łoś-Nowak, 2000), 
however most of them are related to determinants of the Polish foreign policy, 
the place of Poland in the international system or its role among the most influ-
ential international organizations. The question of theorizing foreign policy is 
still of relatively little importance and within the Polish academic discourse FPA 
remains ‘a theory without a chapter’ or a body of microtheories that are not an-
chored in any theory of IR (Houghton, 2007, p. 26). It has to be, however, men-
tioned here that recently some very important works focused on the foreign pol-
icy theorizing have been published. The work of Tomasz Pugacewicz (2017) and 
a publication edited by Edward Haliżak (2018) have to be highlighted. Current-
ly, FPA is a sub-discipline of International Relations that is not only gaining in-
creasing popularity among researchers but also, having its own theoretical and 
methodological basis, shows considerable research potential. Of course, as a dis-
tinct research area, it retains its characteristics or commitments like: to look be-
low the nation-state level of analysis; to build middle-range theories; to pursue 
multicausual explanation spanning multiple levels of analysis; to utilize theory 
and findings from across the spectrum of social science and to view the process 
of decision making as being at least as important as its outcome (Hudson, 2016, 
p. 30). As one can easily see, some of the features of FPA bring it close to eclec-
tic scholarship defined by Sil and Katzenstein. This argument will be also devel-
oped in the following part.
The domestic variables’ return as a theoretical challenge
According to the realist paradigm, power rivalry is the most important factor de-
termining world system politics, where states (viewed as unitary and rational ac-
tors) still play a major role. The main focus of these unitary and rational actors is 
their national security which they are aiming to protect by using the balance of 
power strategy or by the expansion politics. The two mentioned strategies help 
to distinguish between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ variant of neorealism. The first 
one argues that the anarchic nature structure of the international politics en-
courages states to act defensively and balance power in order to maximize se-
curity, whereas the second one assumes the anarchic structure to lead states to 
maximize security by maximizing power – as the most powerful states are the 
most secure. Therefore, power still remains the key concept of realism. However, 
as it has been mentioned above, this ‘highly abstract and purely structural-sys-
temic theory’ (Schweller, 2003, p. 345) cannot explain why states are acting dif-
ferently, although being under the same structural pressure.
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Neoclassical realism, in order to answer this question, has significantly 
changed from its predecessor and focused on domestic politics as well as deci-
sion-making factors and processes. What is more, the above mentioned question 
might be also answered by using the domestic variables and explanations that are 
classic for FPA. That is why, FPA research is repeatedly described as kind of com-
plementary to IR theory. Nevertheless, one has to mention that FPA researchers 
frequently criticize the NCR for its underdevelopment of domestic political and 
decision-making factors (Kaarbo, 2015, p. 204). According to the opinion of Bri-
an Rathburn (2008, pp. 294–321), ideas and domestic politics are mentioned by 
the NCR in a very limited way. Firstly, the domestic variables are still treated as 
intervening conditions influencing political leaders’ reaction to systemic pres-
sures. This is however not accurate from FPA perspective which perceives do-
mestic factors as equal to or sometime even more important than internation-
al ones (Kaarbo, 2015, p. 204). Secondly, neo-classical analyses of world politics 
frequently focus on a group of domestic variables however without justifying 
why some domestic factors are chosen over others.
Therefore, the main challenges of the NCR’s foreign policy analysis are related 
to the possible blend of different levels of analysis as well as different kinds of fac-
tors defined as intervening variables. The first challenge is a possible combination 
of the structural factors with domestic variables without ending up with a set of 
post hoc arguments. The second challenge is about how to mix materialist factors 
like power with domestic variables that are not objectively measured and focused 
on processes of interpretation or perception18 (Wivel, 2005, p. 357). It has to be 
also pointed out here that almost all of IR theories use domestic factors as it was 
mentioned i.e. by Kaarbo (2015), however the difference between them is in the 
question how they use them. They cannot just add them to the core assumptions 
of paradigm, but should embed them in their axioms. Therefore, the inclusion of 
domestic variables or ideas is not inappropriate for realism, however it is of par-
amount importance to do it without going beyond the bounds of the paradigm 
(Rathburn, 2008, p. 304). In the following sections of this part of the article, I am 
going to discuss how some variants of the NCR are trying to deal with the above 
mentioned challenges. I will focus on the balance of threat theory proposed by 
Walt as well as on the Wohlforth’s assumptions regarding the role of perception.
The first challenge is related to the level of analysis, however one has to stress 
that it is the NCR which made it possible to recognize that both systemic and 
unit levels of analysis together might offer a better explanation of world poli-
18 These two problems are also discussed within the academic discourse and mentioned by some 
critics of the realist paradigm. See: Legro and Moravcsik (1999, p. 6), Vasquez (1997) as well 
as Guzzini (2004).
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tics. They should not be treated as mutually exclusive, but rather as intertwined 
to design cumulative and progressive research programmes (Goldgeier, Tetlock, 
2000, p. 88). According to Anders Wivel, this problem can be solved by specify-
ing the policy-contingency framework in a more precise way and consequent-
ly show how resources (and systemic pressures) affect state’s behaviour. This will 
help to avoid the choice between parsimony and complexity, because complexity 
is going to be gradually added in order to develop the explanatory power of the 
theory. The process of going more and more complex starts with the universal 
assumptions of the neorealist theory (1) which lead to the more specific assump-
tions related to the international system and its actors (2). Finally, the system-
ic constraints of those actors are identified and their effects on domestic politics 
are defined (3). As Wivel pointed out, this is the way of moving from the gener-
al theory to specific foreign policy explanations and a complete realist explana-
tion of world politics should include all the three stages, however some scholars 
are focused on one over the other (2005, p. 363). As a consequence, this process 
will help us to explain ‘why state X made a certain move last Tuesday’ as well as 
to predict ‘the consequences of this move for state X by applying the logic of the 
theory to state Y and Z’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 121, cited in Wivel, 2005, p. 363). This 
is showed in the Walt’s balance of threat theory, one of the strongest addition to 
the structural realism that modified the balance of power theory.19 According
to the author, states associate their own security with perceived threats and 
consequently try to balance through international relations. The perception of 
threat is determined by four main variables: aggregate power, geographic prox-
imity, offensive power and aggressive intensions. As Wivel pointed out, some of 
these variables fit to the realist assumption, but some of them, like geographic 
proximity or perceptions of intents, do not. That is why, we should not only ask, 
why this set of variables has been chosen (although historical experience or ide-
ology might be seen as much important), but also which of them should be ap-
plied firstly and why. The hypotheses proposed by Walt (1985, p. 4) showed that 
in order to enter an alliance, ‘states may either balance (ally in opposition to the 
principal source of danger) or bandwagon (ally with the state that poses the ma-
jor threat)’. His proposition is defensive, as he pointed out that states usually pre-
fer security to power. However, according to him, bandwagoning might be an 
offensive strategy, when a state enters an alliance with the most powerful source 
of threat, whereas balancing might be perceived as a defensive strategy. That is 
the most significant characteristic of this theory. Balancing and bandwagoning 
19 The theory was firstly proposed in an article titled Alliance Formation and the Balance of World 
Power, published in the journal International Security in 1985 and later further elaborated in 
the book The Origins of Alliances in 1987.
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are described as responses to threat that states may pose, however the level of the 
threat is affected by the four variables mentioned above. The aim of this paper 
is not to explain the balance of threat theory, therefore I will not explain the hy-
potheses proposed by Walt, but focus on the selection of variables proposed by 
him. According to the proposition of Wivel, in order to explain state’s behaviour 
we should apply one element (one set of the variables) of the theory and if it does 
not explain state action, take another. Nonetheless, Wivel does not specify what 
he classifies as a first set of variables and what as a second etc., consequently, fol-
lowing his logic, we do not know what variable should be applied first. Referring 
to his proposition, one may assume that we start from the systemic pressures and 
then go to domestic politics factors – in this case the role of perception, which 
I claim is the most significant element of the Walt’s theory and which has been 
studied also by FPA scholars, is strongly emphasized. As history has showed, 
wrong perception of the state that might be viewed as a source of threat might 
result in a chain of political mistakes that was proved for instance by the misper-
ception of Iraq’s threat. The relations between power and its perception (or mis-
perception) lead to the second challenge, namely, a possible combination of ma-
terial and ideational factors is going to be solved by  applying some FPA research.
As it has been mentioned above, adherents of the NCR do focus on percep-
tions, beliefs or political leaders’ motives, however while comparing it with FPA 
tradition of research on this topic, this focus according to the NCR still remains 
underdeveloped. As James Goldgeier and Philip E. Tetlock showed (2000; 2001), 
the representatives of realist paradigm (now represented by neo-classical real-
ists) should pay more attention not only to perception, beliefs and motives, but 
also to their origins. In his earlier work Goldgeier (1997, p. 141) stressed that 
Walt after analyzing some ideational domestic factors leaved the origins of them 
to a case-by-case empirical study that is absolutely insufficient for those who 
want to focus not on post hoc arguments, but on identifying long-term political 
processes. Wivel also proposed three possible ways of mixing material and idea-
tional factors. As he pointed out, realists do not dismiss ideas influencing the ac-
tions of policymakers, however they have huge problems with integrating them 
into their analytical framework. Usually, they do this by using empirical case-
by-case studies and consequently are being accused of formulating post hoc ar-
guments only. The three proposed ways might be located on a continuum with 
the solution applying non-materialist variables in the most limited role on the 
one side and the solution applying ideas in the most expanded role on the other.
First, realist can focus primarily on material incentives while analyzing 
states’ foreign policy and then pay attention to perceptions or motives in order 
to explain what is not explainable by materialist variables (Wivel, 2005, p. 369). 
According to the author, this was almost perfectly showed in Walt’s application 
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of his theory. He explained the lack of stable coalition against the US in the con-
temporary world politics by using firstly materialist factors (like the relative geo-
graphic isolation, the lack of offensive power of the US as well as deterrent capa-
bilities of other states) and afterwards the ability of the US to show that it is not 
trying to acquire additional territory. The most important in this type of mixing 
materialist and ideational factors is the question – to what extent we are able to 
explain the states’ foreign policy by using material variables and when we need 
to use non-material ones. For instance, in order to explain the US response to the 
terrorist attack after 11 September, 2001 one has to analyze firstly material costs 
of American power and then non-material cost of its international engagement 
that might by reduced only by making the American power and policy more ac-
ceptable for the rest of the world. The last part of this kind of analysis is possi-
ble only by referring to non-material factors as well as their origins and roots.
Second, realists have to ask how materialist and idealist variables interact and 
how they influence all the foreign policy decision making processes. A very good 
example of this way is the work of Wohlforth focused on the experiences of the 
US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The author referred to the role of 
perception, however in some kind different way than Walt, who (also according 
to Wivel) perceived it as a kind of auxiliary element needed for power analysis – 
used only when materialist factors seemed to be insufficient. Wohlforth showed 
how perception mistakes might lead to wrong foreign policy decisions. Accord-
ing to him, the end of the Cold War should be perceived as a chain reaction to, 
sometimes inaccurate, the perception of power. The Wohlforth’s analysis showed 
very clearly that the nature of material power cannot be easily separated from the 
nature of its perception and consequently the state’s power cannot be solely treat-
ed as the most important, independent variable determining its behaviour. Af-
ter analyzing Soviet and US perceptions of the balance of power during the Cold 
War, Wohlforth showed how perceptions of power influenced superpowers be-
haviour. He pointed out that power is a very difficult to define concept and it is 
almost impossible to separate it from (sometimes flawed) perceptions. There-
fore, one may assume that he called in question the idea of real power. Moreover, 
he stressed the importance of perceptions and difficulties in their measurement 
and identification. Additionally, the author stressed the difficulties of ‘sorting 
out opportunities from more genuine articulations’ (1993, p. 30). His assump-
tions focused on power and its perceptions are frequently perceived as a kind of 
map for realist foreign policy analysis that resulted in his strong conviction that 
FPA and the IR theory should be pursued cumulatively.
Third, the last way of a possible combination of materialist and ideation-
al factors is to ask about the micro-foundations of realism. This might be re-
alized differently – either by using the motivational assumptions that already 
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exist within realist paradigm (like emphasis on self-interest), or by using mo-
tivational assumptions from other disciplines: political science or those locat-
ed outside, like evolutionary theory. However, one has to stress that the last one 
is heavily disputed within the IR discipline. The adoption of assumptions bor-
rowed from political science might be a very good solution that will consequent-
ly allow explaining why states choose one strategy over another by using e.g. be-
havioural decision theory, game theory or prospect theory (Kahneman, Tversky 
1979; 1984) that have their roots also in psychology. Prospect theory clearly ex-
plains under what conditions decision makers might be more likely to take risks. 
In addition, Tetlock and Goldgeier (2001) showed that literature in psycholo-
gy should be of great interest to all IR scholars who represent macrolevel theo-
ries. In order to explain broad contours of international behaviour, IR scholars 
should pay much more attention to issues of misperceptions, possibility of errors 
in statescraft or social and market forces that can either strengthen or attenuate 
deviations from rationality (2001, pp. 71–77).
Also the above mentioned prospect theory might additionally help in ex-
plaining the difference between offensive and defensive realists who paradoxi-
cally differ mostly not about system, but unit-level factor. According to Goldgei-
er and Tetlock (2001, pp. 70–71), ‘when states are in the domain of losses (e.g. 
Germany in 1939, Japan in 1941) they are more likely to take the irredentist ap-
proach that Mearsheimer posits […]. When states are in the domain of gain, 
they are more likely to accept the status quo, as Waltz would predict’. A very sim-
ilar opinion is shared by Glenn Snyder (2002, pp. 154–155), who showed that 
the difference between offensive and defensive realism in the question about 
how much security states desire. As anarchy does not offer any answer, we have 
to wonder under what circumstances states would choose a given strategy. Con-
sequently, following the NCR, we focus on the role of elite consensus or barri-
ers to mobilization that might affect the states’ responses to systemic pressures.
Therefore, as it has been pointed out, it is now time for IR scholars to take ad-
vantage of psychological factors that have been already adopted by FPA research 
since the publication of the previously mentioned influential book of Snyder, 
Bruck and Sapin (1954; 1963; reprinted in 2002). Snyder together with his col-
leagues emphasized decision making processes and as numerous scholars have 
echoed this theme, the psychological approach remains still in a dominant po-
sition even after the 1990s. Publications of Freyberg-Inan, Harrison and James 
(2009) or Edelstein (2002) present research based on psychological assumptions 
regarding the importance of beliefs about others’ intentions. Therefore they offer 
an essential aspect of subjectivity that is missed by many adherents of the NCR. 
They are not too reductionist, as many realists claim, but have the ability to re-
inforce arguments of a given theoretical IR tradition. Consequently, IR theorists 
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should consider how environment and cognition or perception act in systematic 
patterns resulting in variation of world politics. As it has been showed, although 
the NCR is still wedded to anarchic international system as an independent var-
iable and additionally marked by many theoretical flaws, it is still possible to de-
velop its theoretical depth by borrowing from FPA. What I am trying to point 
out is that although neoclassical realism has made some promises that have been 
unfulfilled, there is still a possibility of mixing unit level variables with systemic 
pressures i.e. by referring to the analytical eclecticism.
Conclusion
Valerie Hudson (2007, p. 184), one of the most prominent FPA scholars, pointed 
out that ‘as the field of FPA was first being formed, the goal of theoretical inte-
gration was put forward as an essential task’. Since its inception FPA has engaged 
with different topics and literature related to i.a. public choice theory, political 
psychology or cognitive theory that has consequently made the FPA research ec-
lectic and interdisciplinary. Insights from many disciplines are therefore useful 
for foreign policy analysts while explaining a myriad of diverse decisions. As it 
has been mentioned above, the explanandum of FPA includes the processes and 
resultants of human decision making, nonetheless the most important hallmark 
of FPA is the explanans which includes all the factors influencing decision mak-
ing and decision makers. As a consequence, FPA is not only eclectic (or integra-
tive) and interdisciplinary, but also multifactorial (as it looks for diverse factors 
influencing decision making processes) and multilevel (as it looks for variables 
located at different levels of analysis). Moreover, analysis of foreign policy has 
had no reason to increase competition between theories; FPA scholars, in order 
to understand all the possible policy dilemmas from many different angles, nat-
urally gravitate towards the opinion that theories are rather complementary than 
competitive. This attitude has made FPA the most integrative theoretical enter-
prise of all the IR subfields.
By contrast, most of IR theories have been written as a response to real-
ism and the discipline has been always marked by disputes between repre-
sentatives of the most influential paradigms. Consequently, some IR scholars 
started to ask why ‘isms’ are evil and pointed out that we really do not need to 
organize in ‘sects’ anymore. Thus it seems that one of the most important val-
ues that FPA might offer to the whole discipline is the engagement in theoreti-
cal dialogue with the IR theory. As Wohlforth (2012, p. 51) pointed out in a bril-
liant way, borrowing an idea from Isaiah Berlin (1953) – ‘the fox knows many 
things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing’. According to Wohlforth’s advice, 
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we should act as foxes, knowing different things, using different sources and in 
this way be better at practical tasks like FPA. What is more, being realist does 
not mean that one has to be inevitably a hedgehog believing that only anarchy 
constrains state’s behaviour. On the contrary, since its inception the neoclassical 
realism has adopted several assumptions that are related to human beings and 
their motivations as well as many other factors seriously analyzed by FPA schol-
ars. Borrowing from FPA could make realist analyses deeper and more sophis-
ticated. Additionally, it might be also a kind of movement toward analytical ec-
lecticism by applying such a two-stage approach that will fulfil all the premises
of eclectic scholarship.
Unquestionably, it is extremely difficult to study both realism and foreign 
policy problems, however it is not impossible, especially for those realists who 
assume that realism is not a universal theory applying to many different condi-
tions without alternation. In order to borrow from FPA, realists have to recog-
nize the contingent nature of their theory, as some of neoclassical realists have 
already done. That opinion results in a kind of paradox defined by Wohlforth 
(2012, p. 51) – ‘one can be very critical of academic realist theory and yet still 
find realism very useful in FPA’. However, by introducing FPA studies into IR we 
might be able to integrate not only different levels of analysis, but also materi-
al and ideational factors, however as this article has elucidated – the task is quite 
difficult and marked with many flaws. Additionally, we (as IR scholars) might be 
also able to change our assumptions about rationality being replaced by thicker 
accounts informed by psychology (Hudson, 2007, p. 209).
As I have tried to show, FPA has continuously introduced to the IR new 
concepts or ideas, referring especially to domestic or psychological factors and 
drawing the attention to unit level and subjective variables. That has also result-
ed in changes within methodology, because of employing middle-range theories 
that have been classic to FPA since the 1970s. However, in order to maintain its 
status as an innovative subdiscipline of IR, FPA has to be permanently engaged 
with the theoretical or even philosophical dialogue. What is more, FPA should 
also explore issues that have been discussed within IR, like themes of change or 
globalization in order to maintain this relation mutually beneficial. As Hudson 
(2007, p. 209) pointed out, the quest for theoretical integration between FPA and 
IR has always been always elusive, but this quest might shape the future of the 
discipline. As it has been mentioned in the introduction, FPA theory intersects 
not only with the NCR’s assumptions, but also with social constructivism, liber-
alism or even critical theory.
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